Gulf of Tonkin Incident

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Gulf of Tonkin IncidentPart of Vietnam = War

Chart showing the U.S. Navy's = interpretation of=20 the events of the first part of the Gulf of Tonkin = incidentBelligerentsCommandersStrengthCasualties and losses

Date	August 2, = 1964
Location	Gulf of = Tonkin, Vietnam
Result	United States victory

United = States

Vietnam

Admiral George = Stephen=20 Morrison

N/A

2 Destroyers
severa= l=20 aircraft

3 torpedo = boats

1 = destroyer lightly=20 damaged

1 torpedo boat = sunk
1=20 torpedo boat damaged

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident prompted the first large-scale = involvement=20 of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. It was a pair = of=20 attacks carried out by naval forces of the Demo= cratic=20 Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) against two American destroyers, the USS=20 Maddox and the USS = Turner=20 Joy. The incident occurred on August 2 and 4, = 1964 in the = Gulf=20 of Tonkin.^[1]

The outcome of the incident was the passage by Congress= of the=20 Gulf of = Tonkin=20 Resolution, which granted President Lyndon B. = Johnson the=20 authority to assist any Southeast Asian = country=20 whose government was considered to be jeopardized by "communist = aggression". The=20 resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for escalating = American=20 involvement in the Vietnam War, which = lasted=20 until 1975.

In 2005, it was revealed in an official NSA=20 declassified report^[2]=20 that the Maddox first fired warning shots on the August 2 incident and = that=20 there may have been no North Vietnamese boats at the August 4 incident. = The report=20 said

[I]t is not simply that there is a different story as to what = happened; it=20 is that no attack happened that night. [...] In truth, Hanoi's = navy was=20 engaged in nothing that night but the salvage of two of the boats = damaged on 2=20 August.^[3]

= 1 Background=20
2 The = incident=20
- 2.1 First = attack=20
- 2.2 Second = alleged=20 attack
3 Consequences=20
4 Later = statements about the=20 incident=20
= 5 NSA = report=20
6 Navy = Anniversary=20 Day=20
7 See = also=20
8 Notes=20
= 9 References=20
10 External = links=20

[edit]=20 Background

Main articles: Vietnam=20 War, Military=20 Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group, and Operation=20 34A

Although the United States attended the Geneva= =20 Conference (1954), which was intended to settle the Vietnam = hostilities, it=20 refused to sign the Geneva = Accords=20 (1954). The Accords mandated, among other measures, a ceasefire = line,=20 intended to separate Vietnamese independence and French forces, and = elections to=20 determine the governing power on each side of the line, within two = years. The US=20 was concerned about, among other things, the unreliability of elections = under=20 communist-controlled areas (which then were dominant), the competence of = the=20 ICC, and the harm that officially designating a line in the center of = Vietnam=20 would cause (given the previous experience in Korea). It also forbade = the=20 political interference of other countries in the area, the creation of = new=20 governments without the stipulated elections, and foreign military = presence. By=20 1961, Ngo Dinh Diem = faced=20 significant discontent amongst some quarters of the southern population, = including some Buddhists who were = opposed to=20 the rule of Catholics. In that = year, a=20 communist-led uprising intensified (it began in 1959 upon the decision = of the=20 North Vietnamese Politburo), headed by the National = Liberation Front. The U.S. had begun providing direct support to the = South=20 Vietnamese in the form of military and financial aid and military = advisers, the=20 number of which grew from 600 in 1961 to 16,000 by the end of John=20 F. Kennedy's presidency in 1963.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the = Johnson=20 administration. While Kennedy had originally supported the policy of = sending=20 military advisers to Vietnam, he had begun to alter his thinking due to = what he=20 perceived to be the ineptitude of the Saigon government and = its=20 inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms. Shortly before his=20 assassination in November 1963, he had begun limited recall of American = forces.=20 Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military = escalation=20 in Vietnam as a means to challenge what he perceived as the expansionist = policies of the Soviet Union. The = Cold = War=20 policy of containment was to = be=20 applied to prevent the fall of Southeast Asia = to=20 communist governments under the precepts of the domino theory. = After=20 Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more American forces to = support the=20 Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in = Southeast=20 Asia.

According to the U.S. Naval=20 Institute,^[4]=20 a highly classified program of covert attacks against the Demo= cratic=20 Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) known as Operation 34A, = had begun=20 under the Central= =20 Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964 the program was = transferred to=20 the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, = Vietnam=20 Studies and Observations Group (SOG). For the maritime portion of the = covert=20 operation, Tjeld-class= fast=20 patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to = South Vietnam.=20 Although the crews of the boats were South Vietnamese naval personnel, = approval=20 of the plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant = Sharp,=20 Jr., CINCPAC in Honolulu. = After the=20 coastal attacks began, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the In= ternational=20 Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to = oversee the=20 terms of the Geneva Accords, = but the=20 U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary of Defense Robert S. = McNamara=20 admitted to Congress that the U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in = the=20 South Vietnamese attacks against the DRV. The Maddox, although = ostensibly=20 aware of the operations, was not directly involved in these attacks.

[edit]=20 The incident

=20

Photograph taken from the USS Maddox August = 2, 1964 and = showing North=20 Vietnamese patrol boats

Daniel = Ellsberg, who was=20 on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from the ship, = reports=20 that the ships were on a secret mission (codenamed Desoto) near = North=20 Vietnamese territorial waters. On 31 July 1964, the American = destroyer USS = Maddox=20 (DD-731) began an electronic intelligence collection mission in the = Gulf=20 of Tonkin. Admiral George = Stephen=20 Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his flagship = USS=20 Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31). The ship was under orders not to = approach=20 closer than eight miles (13 km) from the North's coast and four miles (6 = km)=20 from Hon Nieu island.^[5]=20 When the SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the = ship was=20 120 miles (193 km) away from the attacked area.^[6]

[edit]=20 First attack

On 2 August the Maddox claimed it was attacked by three North=20 Vietnamese P-4 patrol torpedo boats 28 = miles (45=20 km) away from the North Vietnamese coast in international waters.[7]=20 The Maddox claimed to have evaded a torpedo attack and = opened fire=20 with its five-inch (127 mm) guns, forcing the patrol craft away. U.S. = aircraft=20 launched from Ticonderoga then attacked the retiring P-4s, = claiming one=20 as sunk and one heavily damaged. The Maddox, suffering very minor = damage=20 from a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet, retired to South = Vietnamese=20 waters where she was joined by the destroyer Turner = Joy.

However, this account has come into sharp dispute with an official = 2005 NSA=20 declassified report^[2]=20 which stated on page 17:

"At 1500G, Captain Herrick ordered Ogier's gun crews to open = fire if the=20 boats approached within ten thousand yards. At about 1505G, the Maddox = fired=20 three rounds to warn off the communist boats. This initial action was = never=20 reported by the Johnson administration, which insisted that the = Vietnamese=20 boats fired first."^[2]

Already before this was revealed, however, some had held that the = actions of=20 the Maddox (i.e., merely the presence of the Maddox in = particular=20 places and times) were provocative to the North Vietnamese because they=20 coincided with the covert South Vietnamese raids. Since the = Desoto=20 patrols were conducted in order to gather just the sort of electronic = emissions=20 that the SOG 34A raids would provoke, it was a reasonable assumption = that the=20 two were "piggybacked." The destroyer's presence also may have been = mistaken by=20 the North Vietnamese as a sign that it was also involved directly in the = raids.

Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not = provoke=20 the 2=20 August fight. He claimed that DRV radar had tracked Maddox = along the=20 coast, thus being aware that the destroyer had not actually attacked = North=20 Vietnam. Yet they ordered their patrol boats to engage it anyway. He = also noted=20 that orders given to Maddox to stay eight miles (13 km) off the = DRV coast=20 put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed only a = five-mile=20 (8 km) nautical limit as its territory. In addition, many nations had = previously=20 carried out similar missions all over the world, and the USS = John=20 R. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission = in=20 similar circumstances without incident.^[8]

[edit]=20 Second alleged attack

On 4=20 August, another Desoto patrol on the North Vietnam coast was = launched=20 by Maddox and the Turner Joy, led by Captain John J. = Herrick. This=20 time their orders indicated that the ships were to close to no more than = 11=20 miles (18 km) from the coast of North Vietnam.^[9]=20 The destroyers received radar and radio signals that they believed = signaled=20 another attack by the North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours the = ships fired=20 on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual = reports of=20 enemies.

An hour later, at 1:27 p.m. Washington time, Herrick sent a cable in = which he=20 admitted that the attack may never have happened and that there may = actually=20 have been no Vietnamese naval craft in the area: "Review of action makes = many=20 reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather = effects on=20 radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No = actual=20 visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before = any=20 further action taken"^[10]

An hour later, Herrick sent another cable, stating, "Entire action = leaves=20 many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough=20 reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft."^[11]=20 In response to requests for confirmation, at around 4:00 p.m. Washington = time,=20 Herrick cabled, "Details of action present a confusing picture although = certain=20 that the original ambush was bona fide."^[11]

At 6:00 p.m. Washington time (5:00 a.m. in the Gulf of Tonkin), = Herrick=20 cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat to close the = Maddox=20 probably fired a torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but not = seen. All=20 subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is = suspected=20 that sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller beat" [sic].[11]

[edit]=20 Consequences

Main article: Gulf = of Tonkin=20 Resolution

Lyndon Johnson, who was up for election that year, launched = retaliatory air=20 strikes and went on national television on 4 August. Although = the=20 Maddox had been involved in providing intelligence support for = South=20 Vietnamese attacks at Hon Me and Hon Ngu, Defense Secretary McNamara = denied, in=20 his testimony before Congress= , that=20 the U.S. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the = Gulf. He=20 thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in = international = waters.

As a result of his testimony, on 7 August, Congress = passed a joint = resolution (H.J. RES 1145), = titled=20 the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted President Johnson the = authority to=20 conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without the benefit of a=20 declaration of war. The Resolution gave President Johnson approval "to = take all=20 necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member = or=20 protocol state of the Southeast=20 Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of = its=20 freedom."

[edit]=20 Later statements about the = incident

Just a few days after the incident, Lyndon Johnson commented = privately: "For=20 all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there." ^[12]

In 1981, Herrick and journalist Robert Scheer = re-examined=20 Herrick's ship's log and determined that the first 4 August torpedo = report which=20 Herrick had maintained had occurred=E2=80=94the "apparent = ambush"=E2=80=94was in fact=20 unfounded.^[11]

Although information obtained well after the fact supported Turner = Joy=20 Captain Herrick's statements about the inaccuracy of the later torpedo = reports=20 as well as the 1981 Herrick/Scheer conclusion about the inaccuracy of = the first,=20 indicating that there was no North Vietnamese attack that night, at the = time=20 U.S. authorities and all of the Maddox crew said they were = convinced that=20 an attack had taken place. As a result, planes from the carriers Ticonde= roga=20 and Const= ellation=20 were sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities = (Operation = Pierce=20 Arrow).

Squadron commander James = Stockdale was one=20 of the U.S. pilots flying overhead during the second alleged attack. = Stockdale=20 wrote in his 1984 book Love and War: "[I] had the best seat in = the house=20 to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom=20 targets=E2=80=94there were no PT boats there=E2=80=A6 There was nothing = there but black water=20 and American fire power." Stockdale said his superiors ordered him to = keep quiet=20 about this. After he was captured, this knowledge became a heavy burden. = He=20 later said he was concerned that his captors would eventually force him = to=20 reveal what he knew about this terrible secret.^[13][14]

In 1995, retired Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, = meeting=20 with former = Secretary=20 of Defense Robert S. = McNamara,=20 categorically denied that Vietnamese gunboats had attacked American = destroyers=20 on 4 August, while admitting to the attack on 2 August.^[15][16]=20 A taped conversation of a meeting several weeks after passage of the = Gulf of=20 Tonkin Resolution was released in 2001, revealing that McNamara = expressed doubts=20 to President Lyndon B. = Johnson that=20 the attack had even occurred.

In the Fall of 1999, retired senior CIA engineering executive S.=20 Eugene Poteat wrote that he was asked in early August 1964 to = determine if=20 the radar operator's report showed a real torpedo boat attack or an = imagined=20 one. He asked for further details on time, weather and surface = conditions. No=20 further details were forthcoming. In the end he concluded that there = were no=20 torpedo boats on the night in question, and that the White House was = interested=20 only in confirmation of an attack, not that there was no such = attack.[17]

[edit]=20 NSA report

In October, 2005 the New York Times = reported=20 that Robert J. Hanyok, a historian for the U.S. National = Security=20 Agency, had concluded that the NSA deliberately distorted the = intelligence=20 reports that it had passed on to policy-makers regarding the 4 August = incident.=20 He concluded that the motive was not political but was probably to cover = up=20 honest intelligence errors. ^[18]

Mr. Hanyok's conclusions were initially published within the NSA in = the=20 Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition of Cryptologic Quarterly, about = five=20 years before they were revealed in the Times article. According = to=20 intelligence officials, the view of government historians that the = report should=20 become public was rebuffed by policymakers concerned that comparisons = might be=20 made to intelligence used to justify the Iraq War that = commenced in=20 2003.^[19]

Reviewing the NSA's archives, Mr. Hanyok concluded that the NSA had = initially=20 misinterpreted North Vietnamese intercepts, believing there was an = attack on 4=20 August. Midlevel NSA officials almost immediately discovered the error, = he=20 concluded, but covered it up by altering documents, so as to make it = appear the=20 second attack had happened.

On 30=20 November 2005,=20 the NSA released the first installment of previously classified = information=20 regarding the Gulf of Tonkin incident, including Mr. Hanyok's article, = "Skunks,=20 Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, = 2=E2=80=934=20 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 = Edition, Vol.=20 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.

The Hanyok article stated that intelligence information was presented = to the=20 Johnson administration "in such a manner as to preclude responsible=20 decisionmakers in the Johnson administration from having the complete = and=20 objective narrative of events." Instead, "only information that = supported the=20 claim that the communists had attacked the two destroyers was given to = Johnson=20 administration officials." ^[20]

With regards to why this happened, Hanyok wrote:

As much as anything else, it was an awareness that President = Johnson would=20 brook no uncertainty that could undermine his position. Faced with = this=20 attitude, Ray Cline was quoted as saying "... we knew it was bum dope = that we=20 were getting from Seventh Fleet, but we were told only to give facts = with no=20 elaboration on the nature of the evidence. Everyone know how volatile = LBJ was.=20 He did not like to deal with uncertainties."^[21]

The full NSA report^[22]=20 was released in January 2008 by the National Security Agency and = published by=20 the Federation of American Scientists, retelling the Vietnam War from = the=20 perspective of "signals intelligence".^[23]

[edit]=20 Navy Anniversary Day

Vietnam's=20 Navy Anniversary Day is August 5, the date of = the=20 second attack, Vietnamese time, where "one of our torpedo squadrons = chased the=20 U.S.S. Maddox from our coastal waters, our first victory over the = U.S.=20 Navy".^[24]

[edit]=20 See also

[edit]=20 Notes

= ^=20 Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf=20
^ ^a=20 ^b=20 ^c=20 "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: = The Gulf of=20 Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964"=20
= ^=20 Hanyok=20 article (page 177)=20
= ^=20 http://www.usni.org/navalhistory/Articles99/NHandrade.htm<= /A>=20
= ^=20 Pentagon Papers=20
= ^=20 Pentagon Papers=20
= ^=20 Pentagon Papers=20
= ^=20 Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat =E2=80=94 Vietnam in = Retrospect=20 (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978) P. 42=20
= ^=20 Pentagon Papers=20
= ^=20 Ellsberg, pp. 9-10.=20
^ ^a=20 ^b=20 ^c=20 ^d=20 Ellsberg, pg. 10.=20
^=20 Cohen, Jeff = (1994-07-27). 30-year=20 Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam War. Retrieved = on 2007-05-09. =20
^=20 Jim Stockdale, Sybil = Stockdale.=20 In Love and War: The Story of a Family's Ordeal and Sacrifice = During the=20 Vietnam Years. Harpercollins; 1st ed. edition (October 1984). ISBN= =20 0060153180. =
^=20 http://www.vho.org/tr/2003/1/Pfitzner114f.html=20
^=20 "McNamara=20 asks Giap: What happened in Tonkin Gulf?". (November 9, 1995). = Associated = Press=20
^=20 CNN Cold War - Interviews: Robert McNamara, = retrieved January=20 23, 2007=20
^=20 S. Eugene Poteat, "Engineering in the CIA: ELINT, = Stealth and the=20 Beginnings of Information Warfare", The Bent of Tau Beta Pi, Fall = 1999=20
^=20 Shane, Scott (2005-12-02). "Vietnam War Intelligence 'Deliberately Skewed,' Secret = Study=20 Says". New York=20 Times. =20
^=20 "Robert J. Hanyok:=20 His NSC study on Tonkin Gulf Deception". (October 31, 2005). New York = Times.=20
^=20 Hanyok=20 article (page 177)=20
^=20 Hanyok=20 article (page 213)=20
^=20 Spartans in=20 Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, Center for = Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2002=20
^=20 Report reveals Vietnam War hoaxes, faked attacks=20
^=20 Pike, PAVN, p. 110

[edit]=20 References

Ellsberg, Daniel (2002). Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the = Pentagon=20 Papers. New York: Viking.

[edit]=20 External links

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later; Flawed = Intelligence=20 and the Decision for War in Vietnam =E2=80=94 National = Security Archive at George Washington University=20
NSA = declassified=20 documents released on 11/30/05=20
Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret=20
From Vietnam to Iraq: Lessons from Tonkin Gulf Lies = by Dr.=20 Mohammad Omar Farooq=20
Tonkin Gulf reports cooked? Historian's research = finds=20 intelligence errors covered up=20
LBJ's address to=20 the nation, August 5, 1964=20
Pentagon = Papers[1]=20
Cronkite: Gulf of Tonkin's Phantom Attack=20
US Navy Historical Site showing charts and photos of = the=20 incident=20
Analysis Casts Doubt on Vietnam War Claims = =E2=80=94 Calvin Woodward,=20 Associated Press, Dec. 1, 2005. "A spy-agency analysis released = Thursday=20 contends a second attack on U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin never = happened,=20 casting further doubt on the leading rationale for escalation of the = Vietnam=20 War."=20
Robert=20 J. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The = Gulf of=20 Tonkin Mystery, 2=E2=80=934 August 1964" Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter = 2000/Spring=20 2001 Edition, Vol. 19, No. 4 / Vol. 20, No. 1.=20
30-year=20 Anniversary: Tonkin Gulf Lie Launched Vietnam War =E2=80=94 = Fairness=20 & Accuracy In Reporting (FAIR): Media Beat July 27, 1994=20
Tonkin Gulf Intelligence "Skewed" According to Official = History=20 and Intercepts =E2=80=94 National = Security Archive at George Washington University=20
Ronnie E.=20 Ford "New Light on Gulf of Tonkin"=20
Original=20 Document: Tonkin Gulf Resolution=20
Bibliography: Tonkin Gulf Incidents

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