![](3D"http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/join.jpg"=20) |
| Links |
National Security Agency
Gulf=20
of Tonkin Documents =
Index |
"Skunks,=20
Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf =
of Tonkin=20
Mystery, 2-4 August 1964"
by NSA historian Robert J.=20
Hanyok |
| Memorandum from Senate Foreign =
Relations=20
Committee staffer Carl Marcy to NSA Deputy Director =
Dr. Louis=20
Tordella; 24 Jan 1972 |
"Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, =
Remains=20
Secret"
By Scott Shane
New York=20
Times
October 31, =
2005 |
|
Related=20
posting |
The=20
Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years =
Later
Flawed=20
Intelligence and the Decision for War in=20
Vietnam | |
![](3D"http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/mapdrop.jpg"=20) |
| Map from a chronology of events =
produced by=20
U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Delmar C. Lang in =
October=20
=
1964 | | Washington,=20
D.C., 1 December 2005 - The largest U.S. =
intelligence=20
agency, the National Security Agency, today declassified over 140 formerly top secret=20
documents -- histories, chronologies, signals =
intelligence [SIGINT] reports, and oral history interviews =
-- on=20
the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident. Included in the =
release=20
is a controversial article by =
Agency=20
historian Robert J. Hanyok on SIGINT and the Tonkin Gulf =
which=20
confirms what historians have long argued: that there was =
no=20
second attack on U.S. ships in Tonkin on August 4, 1964. =
According=20
to National Security Archive research fellow John Prados, =
"the=20
American people have long deserved to know the full truth =
about=20
the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The National Security Agency =
is to be=20
commended for releasing this piece of the puzzle. The =
parallels=20
between the faulty intelligence on Tonkin Gulf and the =
manipulated=20
intelligence used to justify the Iraq War make it all the =
more=20
worthwhile to re-examine the events of August 1964 in =
light of new=20
evidence." Last year, Prados edited a National=
=20
Security Archive briefing book which =
published for=20
the first time some of the key intercepts from the Gulf of =
Tonkin=20
crisis.
The National Security Agency has long resisted the=20
declassification of material on the Gulf of Tonkin =
incident,=20
despite efforts by Senate Foreign Relations Committee =
staffer Carl=20
Marcy (who had prepared a staff study on the August 4 =
incident);=20
former Deputy Director Louis Tordella, and John Prados to =
push for=20
declassification of key documents. Today's release is =
largely due=20
to the perseverance of FOIA requester Matthew M. Aid, who=20
requested the Hanyok study in April 2004 and brought the =
issue to=20
the attention of The New York Times when he =
learned that=20
senior National Security Agency officials were trying to =
block=20
release of the documents. New York =
Times =
reporter Scott=20
Shane wrote that higher-level officials at =
the NSA=20
were "fearful that [declassification] might prompt =
uncomfortable=20
comparisons with the flawed intelligence used to justify =
the war=20
in Iraq." The glaring light of publicity encouraged the =
Agency's=20
leaders finally to approve declassification of the =
documents.
Hanyok's article, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the =
Flying Fish:=20
The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964," =
originally published in the National Security Agency's =
classified=20
journal Cryptologic Quarterly in early 2001, =
provides a=20
comprehensive SIGINT-based account "of what happened in =
the Gulf=20
of Tonkin." Using this evidence, Hanyok argues that the =
SIGINT=20
confirms that North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked a =
U.S.=20
destroyer, the USS Maddox, on August 2, 1964, although =
under=20
questionable circumstances. The SIGINT also shows, =
according to=20
Hanyok, that a second attack, on August 4, 1964, by North=20
Vietnamese torpedo boats on U.S. ships, did not occur =
despite=20
claims to the contrary by the Johnson administration. =
President=20
Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara treated Agency =
SIGINT=20
reports as vital evidence of a second attack and used this =
claim=20
to support retaliatory air strikes and to buttress the=20
administration's request for a Congressional resolution =
that would=20
give the White House freedom of action in Vietnam.
Hanyok further argues that Agency officials had =
"mishandled"=20
SIGINT concerning the events of August 4 and provided top =
level=20
officials with "skewed" intelligence supporting claims of =
an=20
August 4 attack. "The overwhelming body of reports, if =
used, would=20
have told the story that no attack occurred." Key pieces =
of=20
evidence are missing from the Agency's archives, such as =
the=20
original decrypted Vietnamese text of a document that =
played an=20
important role in the White House's case. Hanyok has not =
found a=20
"smoking gun" to demonstrate a cover-up but believes that =
the=20
evidence suggests "an active effort to make SIGINT fit the =
claim=20
of what happened during the evening of 4 August in the =
Gulf of=20
Tonkin." Senior officials at the Agency, the Pentagon, and =
the=20
White House were none the wiser about the gaps in the=20
intelligence. Hanyok's conclusions have sparked =
controversy among=20
old Agency hands but his research confirms the insight of=20
journalist I.F. Stone, who questioned the second attack =
only weeks=20
after the events. Hanyok's article is part of a larger =
study on=20
the National Security Agency and the Vietnam War, =
"Spartans in=20
Darkness," which is the subject of a pending FOIA request =
by the=20
National Security=20
=
Archive. |
![](3D"http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/nsarchiv.gif")
![](3D"http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/kimbo350.jpg"=20)