On this 40th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident it =
is=20
appropriate to recall an affair that has much history =
wound around=20
it, a watershed in the U.S. move toward full-scale war in =
Vietnam.=20
At the time, in August 1964, the administration of =
President=20
Lyndon B. Johnson used the incident as a pretext to seek =
from=20
Congress a joint resolution approving the use of force in=20
Southeast Asia, which it then relied upon as legal =
justification=20
for all-out war. The episode opened the way for an =
American=20
military commitment that ultimately peaked in March 1969 =
with=20
548,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam plus additional =
supporting=20
forces in Thailand. Some 59,000 Americans and several =
million=20
Vietnamese died in the conflict.
More recently, the Tonkin Gulf incident has regularly =
been=20
invoked in connection with the lead-up to the war in Iraq, =
where=20
the administration of President George W. Bush also cited =
threats=20
to the United States to obtain congressional approval for =
the use=20
of force. Those claims, too, proved to be based largely on =
seriously flawed intelligence and possibly, according to =
some=20
critics, manipulated. The parallels to Tonkin make it all =
the more=20
worthwhile to re-examine the events of 40 years ago on the =
basis=20
of newly acquired evidence.
Background
The particulars of the incidents of early August 1964, =
as=20
reported by the Johnson administration, were crucial to =
gaining=20
the legislative authority President Johnson sought, which =
came in=20
the form of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. At the time and =
for some=20
years afterward, the United States government took the =
position=20
that it had done nothing to provoke a naval engagement in =
the=20
Tonkin Gulf between North Vietnamese and U.S. warships. =
The=20
Johnson administration also maintained that it had acted =
with=20
restraint, refusing to respond to an initial North =
Vietnamese=20
attack on August 2, 1964, and reacting only after North =
Vietnam=20
made a second naval attack two nights later. Both of these =
assertions turned out to be misleading.
In fact the United States at the time was carrying out =
a=20
program of covert naval commando attacks against North =
Vietnam and=20
had been engaged in this effort since its approval by =
Johnson in=20
January 1964. (For documentation of this program, carried =
out=20
under Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34-A, see the Tonkin Gulf =
subset of=20
the National Security Archive's microfiche collection, =
U.S.=20
Policy in the Vietnam War, I: 1954-1968.) A fresh =
addition to=20
the declassified record is the intelligence estimate =
included in=20
this briefing book, Special National Intelligence Estimate =
50-2-64. Published in May 1964, the estimate again =
demonstrates=20
that the United States purposefully directed OPLAN 34-A to =
pressure North Vietnam, to the extent of attempting to =
anticipate=20
Hanoi's reaction. It wrongly concluded that North Vietnam, =
while=20
taking precautionary measures, "might reduce the level of =
the=20
insurrections for the moment." (Note =
1) In fact Hanoi decided instead to commit its regular =
army=20
forces to the fighting in South Vietnam.
The Johnson administration's characterization of the =
specifics=20
of the Tonkin Gulf incident has proven to be inaccurate.=20
Administration officials contended that the U.S. warship =
simply=20
happened to be cruising in the Gulf to exert a U.S. =
presence --=20
engaged in "innocent passage" under international law. The =
naval=20
battle between the destroyer USS Maddox and =
several North=20
Vietnamese torpedo boats occurred on August 2, 1964, in =
the=20
immediate aftermath of a series of 34-A maritime raids on =
North=20
Vietnamese coastal targets. Among the targets were two =
offshore=20
islands, Hon Me and Hon Ngu, which were closely approached =
by the=20
Maddox prior to the August 2 engagement. The =
American=20
destroyer was in international waters when the battle =
itself took=20
place but the North Vietnamese made the logical connection =
that=20
the 34-A raids and the destroyer's appearance were =
related. In=20
fact the mission of the Maddox was specifically =
to record=20
North Vietnamese radar and other electronic emissions =
which could=20
be expected to spike after a 34-A raid.
Senior administration officials were well aware of the=20
connection between the 34-A raids and the destroyer's =
intelligence=20
cruise, called a "DeSoto Patrol." Secretary of Defense =
Robert S.=20
McNamara, in his very first telephone conversation with =
President=20
Johnson about the battle, at 10:30 a.m. Washington time on =
August=20
3, raised the issue. LBJ wanted McNamara to hold a private =
briefing for congressional leaders on Capitol Hill. =
McNamara=20
replied, "I think I should also, or we should also at that =
time,=20
Mr. President, explain this OPLAN 34-A. There's no =
question but=20
what that had bearing on." (Note =
2) McNamara went on to describe the 34-A mission, =
including=20
mention of the two islands, the number of attack boats=20
participating, their ammunition expenditures, and other=20
details.
Appearing before the legislators, Secretary McNamara =
did=20
mention the 34-A raids but asserted they were South=20
Vietnamese naval missions and had nothing to do with =
the=20
United States. In fact the 34-A missions were unilaterally =
controlled by the U.S., using boats procured and =
maintained by the=20
U.S. Navy, attacking targets selected by the CIA, in an =
operation=20
paid for by the United States. The only South Vietnamese =
aspect of=20
34-A was the administrative responsibility borne by that=20
government's special forces for their nationals recruited =
as the=20
commandos for the missions, commandos who were =
nevertheless led by=20
Americans. Some accounts by Americans who participated in =
such=20
missions actually maintain that Americans were present =
aboard the=20
attack boats during the raids of August 2. (Note =
3)
Secretary McNamara not only advanced the fiction of =
34-A as a=20
South Vietnamese enterprise in a private meeting with =
congressmen,=20
he repeated it at congressional hearings on the =
administration's=20
requested use of force resolution. At an executive session =
hearing=20
held on August 6, McNamara declared, "Our Navy played =
absolutely=20
no part in, was not associated with, was not aware of, any =
South=20
Vietnamese actions, if there were any." (Note =
4) Controversy over Johnson administration claims =
regarding=20
the Gulf of Tonkin incident began not long after the =
events=20
themselves and grew over time, leading to an unusual =
review of the=20
events in a new set of hearings before the Senate Foreign=20
Relations Committee in February 1968. Secretary McNamara =
again=20
served as the administration's lead witness and claimed =
that the=20
issue of provocation had been "fully explored" at the 1964 =
hearings. Specifically, McNamara declared that Congress =
had=20
investigated whether the attacks "were in any way provoked =
by or=20
related to certain South Vietnamese naval activity." =
McNamara=20
later reasserted that the 34-A missions were =
"countermeasures=20
being taken by the South Vietnamese in response to North=20
Vietnamese aggression." (Note =
5) These administration assertions were highly =
misleading as=20
the declassified documentary record of OPLAN 34-A makes =
abundantly=20
clear.
The leading edge of doubt which ultimately forced the =
February=20
1968 review of the Gulf of Tonkin incident arose over =
whether a=20
second attack on U.S. warships had occurred on the night =
of August=20
4. Following the initial naval battle of August 2, =
President=20
Johnson ordered a second U.S. destroyer, the USS C. =
Turner=20
Joy, to join the Maddox, after which both =
ships=20
sailed back up the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August =
4, both=20
ships thought they had come under attack again and sent =
messages=20
reporting enemy contacts, torpedoes in the water, and so =
on, while=20
directing a good deal of fire at the supposed adversary. =
Following=20
this supposed repeat challenge to "innocent passage," =
President=20
Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing against North Vietnam =
and=20
asked for the congressional resolution with which he =
prosecuted=20
the Vietnam war.
But the certainty of the "second attack" would never be =
so=20
clear as the first. The initial battle took place in =
daylight.=20
There were photographs of the North Vietnamese torpedo =
boats=20
engaged in a fire-fight with the Maddox, Admiral =
Thomas=20
H. Moorer retained a dud shell from one of the Vietnamese =
vessels=20
as a souvenir, and numerous Maddox sailors =
confirmed=20
sighting at least three torpedoes. However, there was no =
physical=20
evidence at all for the August 4 attack claims. The =
supposed=20
surface action took place at night and in poor weather. =
The=20
skipper and four seamen aboard the C. Turner Joy=20
variously claimed having seen a searchlight, boat cockpit =
lights,=20
smoke at a location where they claimed their gunfire had =
hit a=20
Vietnamese vessel in the water, and one, or perhaps two, =
torpedo=20
wakes. The Navy further claimed their vessels had sunk two =
attacking torpedo boats. But there was no wreckage, nor =
bodies of=20
dead sailors. No photographs or other physical evidence =
existed.=20
Radar and sonar sightings provided an exceedingly =
confusing set of=20
data at best. (Note =
6)
American pilots from the carrier USS =
Ticonderoga sent=20
to help defend the destroyers from their supposed =
attackers told=20
the same story. Commander James B. Stockdale, who led this =
flight=20
of jets, spotted no enemy, and at one point saw the =
Turner=20
Joy pointing her guns at the Maddox. As =
Stockdale,=20
who retired an admiral after a distinguished career that =
included=20
being shot down and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese, =
later=20
wrote: "There was absolutely no gunfire except our own, no =
PT boat=20
wakes, not a candle light let alone a burning ship. None =
could=20
have been there and not have been seen on such a black =
night." (Note =
7) In his memoir, Stockdale also remarked on the =
situation: "I=20
had the best seat in the house from which to detect =
boats-if there=20
were any. I didn't have to look through surface haze and =
spray=20
like the destroyers did, and yet I could see the =
destroyers' every=20
move vividly." (Note =
8) These comments reinforce the dispatches from the =
Navy's=20
on-scene commander, Captain John Herrick, who after filing =
various=20
reports of attacks sent a cable that questioned them all. =
A Top=20
Secret August 28, 1964 chronology prepared for President =
Johnson=20
summarized Herrick's report, sent at 1:27 p.m. Washington =
time on=20
August 4, as follows: "a review of the action makes many =
reported=20
contacts and torpedoes fired 'appear doubtful'. 'Freak =
weather=20
effects' on radar, and 'over-eager' sonarmen may have =
accounted=20
for many reports. 'No visual sightings' have been reported =
by the=20
Maddox, and the Commander suggests that a =
'complete=20
evaluation' be undertaken before any further action." But=20
Washington had already decided to strike North =
Vietnam.
Stockdale's commentaries came after America's Vietnam =
war had=20
ended, but questions regarding the "second attack" were =
already=20
strong enough by 1968 to force renewed congressional =
attention.=20
Secretary McNamara pulled out a trump card during the 1968 =
hearings to silence doubters. The trump was a set of=20
communications intercepts made by the Naval Security Group =
detachment on the destroyer Maddox, the very unit =
whose=20
presence defined this cruise as a DeSoto Patrol. As =
McNamara=20
described the intercepts in his testimony: "Intelligence =
reports=20
from a highly classified and unimpeachable source reported =
that=20
North Vietnam was making preparations to attack our =
destroyers=20
with two Swatow [patrol] boats and one PT boat if the PT =
could be=20
made ready in time. The same source reported, while the =
engagement=20
was in progress on August 4, that the attack was underway. =
Immediately after the attack ended, the source reported =
that the=20
North Vietnamese lost two ships in the engagement." (Note =
9)
Secretary McNamara played the intercepts very close to =
his=20
chest. Describing them only in general terms, he refused =
to leave=20
copies with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Staff =
member=20
J. Norvill Jones later recalled that McNamara cited the =
staff's=20
lack of proper clearances as a reason, but also notes that =
McNamara's Pentagon had stalled the Committee's =
investigation of=20
Tonkin Gulf since 1965, and had furnished some requested =
documents=20
only after the intercession of Senator Richard Russell of =
Georgia,=20
the powerful chairman of the Armed Services Committee and =
a close=20
friend of Lyndon Johnson's. Years later, Foreign Relations =
Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright was finally able =
to=20
arrange with the Nixon administration for Jones and staff =
director=20
Carl Marcy to actually view the intercepts. Jones' =
reaction is=20
important to record:
Of the several messages we were allowed to scan, only =
one was=20
from August 4. The others clearly related to the =
incident on=20
August 2.
My reading of the Aug. 4 intercept was that it was a =
boastful=20
summary of the attack on August 2. Even the NSA =
[National=20
Security Agency] officials could not say that it =
definitely=20
related to the Aug. 4 action. In addition the time =
sequence of=20
the intercept and the reported action from the U.S. =
destroyers=20
did not jibe. Curiously, NSA could not find the original =
of the=20
Aug. 4 intercept, although it did have originals of the =
others.=20
(Note=
=20
10)
A 1980s investigation of these events by reporters for =
U.S.=20
News and World Report found intelligence officers who =
agreed=20
with Jones' reading of the Tonkin Gulf intercepts. They =
quoted Ray=20
S. Cline, who at the time headed the CIA's Intelligence=20
Directorate and would later become chief of the State =
Department's=20
Bureau of Intelligence and Research: "I began to see that =
the=20
[intercepts] which were being received at the time of the =
second=20
attack almost certainly could not have referred to the =
second=20
attack because of the time differences involved. Things =
were being=20
referred to which, although they might have been taking =
place at=20
that time, could not have been reported back so quickly." =
(Note=
=20
11) Also suspect was the fact that intercepts from =
August 2=20
had been recorded widely by NSA stations as well as the=20
Maddox while those of the 4th reportedly were =
recorded=20
only by a listening post at Phu Bai in South Vietnam. =
Louis=20
Tordella, long-serving deputy director of the National =
Security=20
Agency, was among those intelligence officers who discount =
the=20
validity of the August 4 intercepts.
New Evidence
Now, forty years later, Americans for the first time =
have the=20
opportunity to make up their own minds on the Tonkin Gulf=20
intercepts. After repeated requests using the Mandatory=20
Declassification Review process, this analyst was able to =
get them=20
declassified in March 2003.
The cables included here are the relevant NSA=20
intercepts. In the immediate aftermath of the "crisis," =
the White=20
House asked for the intercepted radio traffic and =
it was=20
sent over. A cover note for National Security Adviser =
McGeorge=20
Bundy on August 8 reads: "Last night the White House =
Situation=20
Room relayed a request from Mr. Bundy for all intercepts =
which=20
preceded and related to the second attack on the =
Maddox=20
and Turner Joy. The attached messages were =
selected by=20
CIA and NSA." (Note=
=20
12) The note covered a list that contained the exact =
items=20
reproduced here, including the five (out of eight) which =
have been=20
declassified as of this writing.
A review of the documents will make clear that the =
cables were=20
not raw intercepts of North Vietnamese radio =
traffic but=20
rather reports from the intercepting units on the =
Maddox and elsewhere which summarize the =
contents of the raw intercepts. This point is important =
because it=20
means that the infamous intercepts could not have been =
simultaneously passed along to the Hawaii =
headquarters of the=20
Commander-in-Chief Pacific or to Washington. Radio =
intelligence=20
units had to perform three activities before the=20
information could be passed up the chain of command: the=20
intercepts themselves had to be recorded, the North =
Vietnamese=20
communications had to be decoded and translated, and a =
message had=20
to be assembled using the new information. Of course, =
those=20
messages themselves had then to be coded and encrypted in =
U.S.=20
systems before being transmitted on American radio nets. =
All this=20
is crucial to bear in mind because claims as to the=20
unimpeachability of the intelligence advanced by the =
Johnson=20
administration turn on comparisons of the time these =
messages were=20
sent versus the times that Captain Herrick and his =
destroyers=20
reported various actions supposedly taking place in the =
Tonkin=20
Gulf.
Since time is literally of the essence here, the reader =
should=20
understand how to interpret the times printed on these =
messages.=20
All United States military traffic is sent using "Zulu" =
time, or=20
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), and each message contains a =
"date/time=20
group" that identifies the time of transmission. Messages =
are=20
frequently referred to by their date/time groups in =
official=20
commentaries and in references in subsequent message =
traffic. A=20
date/time group is composed first of two numbers =
identifying a=20
day, then of four numbers that show the hour and minute =
(using a=20
twenty-four hour clock). Sometimes messages also list the =
month=20
and the year, the latter indicated by two final numbers. =
Thus=20
"03/1211Z Aug" refers to 12:11 p.m. GMT on August 3, 1964. =
Local=20
time in the Tonkin Gulf is seven hours ahead of GMT, and =
twelve=20
hours ahead of Washington, DC. The date/time above =
therefore=20
equates to 7:11 p.m. on August 3 in the Tonkin Gulf, and =
7:11 a.m.=20
on August 3 in Washington. Keep these time differences in =
mind=20
when examining the message traffic below.
Not mentioned thus far in regard to possible U.S. =
provocation=20
is the fact that 34-A forces carried out another =
raid on=20
North Vietnam during the night of August 3/4, when the =
U.S.=20
destroyers were beginning their run back up the Tonkin =
Gulf. If=20
Hanoi was responding to the first raid, a second one =
furnished an=20
equivalent reason to act against the reinforced DeSoto =
Patrol.=20
Yet, it appears Hanoi decided not to act. North Vietnamese =
officials, including Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen =
Giap,=20
explained at a retrospective international conference in =
1997 that=20
their August 2 response had been ordered by a local naval =
command,=20
not the Hanoi leadership. (Note=
=20
13) The Vietnamese said they had mounted no naval =
sortie on=20
the 4th. This is consistent. Concerned at the severity of =
the U.S.=20
reaction to the August 2 engagement, the Hanoi leadership =
could=20
very well have made sure not to mount a subsequent =
operation,=20
even in the face of a second 34-A coastal =
raid.
Congressional staffer Jones and others are quite right =
to=20
observe that a number of the intercepts describe the naval =
action=20
of August 2. In that battle there were shootouts =
between=20
North Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. aircraft, and two =
of the=20
North Vietnamese boats were sunk, as described in one of =
the=20
messages. Another message describes a sighting of "two =
enemy=20
assault vessels" east of the island of Hon Me. The time of =
day=20
reported in the message, 8:28 p.m. local (message =
03/1328Z),=20
actually corresponds very closely to the time, 9:35 p.m., =
when the=20
Maddox had been in this position on August =
1,=20
prior to the initial naval engagement. That time is =
recorded on=20
track charts of the Maddox's position in the =
official=20
U.S. Navy history for this period of the Vietnam war. (Note=
=20
14) The two destroyers traveling together were near =
Hon Me=20
only in mid-afternoon of August 4. Hon Me had been one of =
the=20
targets of the initial 34-A maritime operation, which had =
hit at=20
half past midnight, July 31 -- a rather close connection. =
The=20
North Vietnamese message had included orders to naval =
officers to=20
shadow the Americans.
The next message in the series (04/1140Z) reports a =
preparatory=20
order to two North Vietnamese patrol boats to prepare for=20
operations and informs them that a torpedo boat, the =
T-333, may=20
join them if it can be made ready in time. Three minutes =
later=20
there was a sighting report for a U.S. destroyer. This =
sounds like=20
possible support for the hypothesis that the North =
Vietnamese=20
fought Americans again on August 4, but only until the =
American=20
side is also examined. Captain Herrick's destroyers first =
reported=20
radar sightings in a message with the date/time group =
04/1240Z.=20
The base for the North Vietnamese Swatow patrol vessels =
referenced=20
in these messages was at Quang Khe, near Dong Hoi, roughly =
110=20
nautical miles from Hon Me. Not even a well-maintained and =
fully=20
fuelled Swatow able to sustain its maximum speed of over =
40 knots=20
could cover that distance from Quang Khe in the time =
interval=20
between the intercepts and the U.S. message.
Meanwhile, in Washington, at 9:43 a.m. on August 4, =
Secretary=20
McNamara had another conversation with President Johnson. =
Their=20
discussion reflects McNamara's knowledge of the intercepts =
where=20
he says, referring to the U.S. destroyer (McNamara uses =
the=20
singular), "this ship is allegedly, uh, to be attacked =
tonight."=20
(Note=
=20
15) McNamara and the president went on to discuss what =
retaliation they could carry out for the attack (that had =
not=20
happened), including bombing targets in North Vietnam or=20
undertaking more 34-A maritime assaults. An hour later, =
when=20
McNamara called in the first report that the alleged =
attack had=20
begun, he was already prepared with a list of options.
Much of the supposed action of August 4 occurred =
between the=20
U.S. message just mentioned and another from Captain =
Herrick at=20
04/1602Z, in which the destroyers reported having evaded =
torpedoes=20
and to having "sunk" at least one attacking surface craft. =
It was=20
during this time that the wild melee of radar and sonar=20
observations and heavy gunfire occurred, and that =
Commander=20
Stockdale's aircraft saw nothing. The next of the NSA =
intercepts=20
is recorded at 04/1630Z. It summarized the North =
Vietnamese=20
reporting about having shot at aircraft and observing one =
fall=20
into the sea, with "an enemy vessel perhaps wounded." An=20
amplification message followed at 04/1644Z admitting "we=20
sacrificed two comrades," and specifying they had fired at =
two=20
aircraft. That matched the events of August 2, when there =
had been=20
exchanges between the Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. =
planes,=20
and when the Maddox had been hit by at least some =
small-caliber cannon shells from the North Vietnamese =
torpedo=20
boats. The reports did not match the facts of =
August 4,=20
when no boats had passed beneath the U.S. planes to shoot =
at them.=20
The history of U.S. destroyers carried on the Navy's =
official=20
website no longer contains any reference to a naval =
engagement=20
having occurred on August 4.
The last two messages in this set (05/0438Z, 05/0627Z) =
show the=20
North Vietnamese Swatow boats to have regrouped at Hon =
Me=20
island with a couple of torpedo boats and to have received =
orders=20
for some action to be carried out in the northern Gulf of =
Tonkin=20
in the afternoon of August 5. By that time Captain =
Herrick's=20
DeSoto Patrol had cleared the Gulf and was no longer a =
factor.
An equally plausible construction of the events =
pictured in=20
these intercepts is that the North Vietnamese, in the face =
of the=20
34-A maritime raids and sudden appearance of a heavy U.S. =
warship,=20
ordered their Swatow patrol boats to rendezvous at Hon Me =
with=20
surviving torpedo boats in preparation for defensive =
action=20
against the U.S. destroyers, by then gone. It is not =
probable that=20
the North Vietnamese, who knew from official U.S. =
statements that=20
Captain Herrick had been reinforced, would have sent their =
Swatow=20
boats, with no armament capable of sinking a destroyer=20
(machineguns and light cannon only, no torpedoes), against =
the=20
strengthened U.S. destroyer force. The intercepts =
themselves=20
confirm that the torpedo boat T-333, the only survivor of =
the=20
August 2 battle, was not ready to sail at the critical =
moment on=20
August 4, when Hanoi could have set up a battle for that =
day.
Conclusion
Among the most prophetic and disturbing statements in =
the=20
declassified record are those by national security adviser =
McGeorge Bundy, at the White House staff meeting at 8 a.m. =
on=20
August 5, 1964. Bundy told the staff, according to the =
memorandum=20
for the record drafted by military aide William Y. Smith: =
"On the=20
first attack, the evidence would be pretty good. On the =
second one=20
the amount of evidence we have today is less than we had=20
yesterday. This resulted primarily from correlating bits =
and=20
pieces of information eliminating double counting and =
mistaken=20
signals. This much seemed certain: There was an attack. =
How many=20
PT boats were involved, how many torpedoes were fired, =
etc. - all=20
this was still somewhat uncertain. This matter may be of =
some=20
importance since Hanoi has denied making the second =
attack." We=20
now know this denial was accurate and Washington's claims =
were=20
not, and that senior officials knew of the "double =
counting and=20
mistaken signals." But when new staffer Douglass Cater - =
attending=20
his first morning meeting on August 5, 1964 - questioned =
the need=20
for a Congressional resolution, "Bundy, in reply, jokingly =
told=20
him perhaps the matter should not be thought through too =
far. For=20
his own part, he welcomed the recent events as =
justification for a=20
resolution the Administration had wanted for some =
time."
Change a few of the words in these quotes - perhaps =
substitute=20
"weapons of mass destruction" for "PT boats" and =
"torpedoes," and=20
"Baghdad" for "Hanoi" - and the parallels with today =
become all=20
too apt.
This new evidence permits us to view more accurately =
the=20
internal deliberations of the Johnson administration. =
Especially=20
in combination with LBJ's telephone conversations with =
McNamara,=20
recently made available to the public with transcriptions, =
the=20
material clearly shows Washington rushing to a judgment on =
events=20
in the Tonkin Gulf, which it seized upon as evidence in =
support of=20
its predetermined intention to escalate the conflict in =
Vietnam.=20
Those who questioned the veracity of the Johnson =
administration's=20
description of the Gulf of Tonkin incident at the time =
were right=20
to do so. The manipulation of this international situation =
for the=20
administration's political purpose of obtaining a =
congressional=20
authorization for the use of force bears considerable =
similarity=20
to the manner in which the Bush administration manipulated =
intelligence regarding the possibility that Iraq possessed =
weapons=20
of mass destruction to gain its own legislative approval =
for war=20
against that country. (Note=
=20
16) In both cases, truth became the first casualty. In =
both=20
cases, the consequences far outweighed anything =
anticipated by the=20
presidents involved.
Notes
1. CIA, SNIE 50-2-64, "Probable =
Consequences of=20
Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos," May =
25, 1964=20
(declassified June 8, 2004). Source: Lyndon Baines Johnson =
Library=20
(LBJL): Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers (LBJP): National =
Security=20
File: Country File Vietnam, b. 89, folder: "Vietnam 3S: =
CIA=20
Assesses Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions,=20
5/64-1/68."
2. Johnson-McNamara Telephone =
conversation, 10:30=20
AM, August 3, 1964, in John Prados, ed. The White =
House=20
Tapes. New York: The New Press, 2003, p. 185.
3. Michael Lee Lanning and Ray W. =
Stubbe.=20
Inside Force Recon: Recon Marines in Vietnam. New =
York:=20
Ballantine, 1989.
4. U.S. Congress (88th Congress, 2nd =
Session)=20
Foreign Relations Committee. Executive Sessions of the =
Senate=20
Foreign Relations Committee, Historical Series, v. =
XVI.=20
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 293.
5. McNamara Opening Statement, February =
20, 1968.=20
Reprinted, The New York Times, February 21, 1968, =
p.=20
21.
6. The best survey of the data is in =
Edwin E.=20
Moise. The Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the =
Vietnam=20
War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, =
1996.=20
Also see Anthony Austin, The President's War: The =
Story of the=20
Tonkin Gulf Resolution and How the Nation was Trapped in=20
Vietnam. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971; and =
Eugene C=20
Windchy, Tonkin Gulf. Garden City (NY): =
Doubleday, 1971.=20
7. Admiral James B. Stockdale, "Another =
Gulf,=20
Other Blips on a Screen," The Washington Post, =
August 7,=20
1988, p. B7.
8. James B. Stockdale, In Love and =
War.=20
New York: Bantam Books, 1985, p. 17.
9. McNamara Testimony Excerpts Gathered =
for=20
President Johnson, February 20, 1968. LBJL: LBJP: National =
Security File (NSF): NSC Histories series, box 39, folder: =
"Gulf=20
of Tonkin, v. III (Tabs 23-31)."
10. J. Norvill Jones, Letter to the =
Editor,=20
Washington Post, November 23, 1995, p. A22.
11. "The Phantom Battle that Led to =
War: Can It=20
Happen Again?" U.S. News and World Report, July =
23, 1984,=20
quoted p. 63.
12. CIA Cover Note, August 8, 1964.=20
LBJL"LBJP:NSF: Country File Vietnam, box 77, Folder: =
"Vietnam=20
3(A)3 Gulf of Tonkin, 8/64 [3 of 3]."
13. The author was a member of the =
U.S.=20
delegation to the conference, and personally witnessed =
General=20
Giap make this statement to Robert McNamara. The =
conference,=20
"Missed Opportunities? Former U.S. and Vietnamese =
Reexamine the=20
Vietnam War, 1961-1968," was held in Hanoi, June 20-23, =
1997. It=20
was sponsored by Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. =
Institute=20
for International Studies and the Institute for =
International=20
Relations (Hanoi). The National Security Archive provided =
the=20
documentary base, along with other support, for the=20
conference.
14. Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. =
Fitzgerald,=20
The United States Navy in the Vietnam Conflict, II: =
From=20
Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965. =
Washiington: Naval=20
Historical Center, 1986, map p. 412.
15. Telephone Conversation, Lyndon B.=20
Johnson-Robert S. McNamara, August 4, 1964, 9:43 AM. =
Prados, ed.=20
The White House Tapes, p. 193.
16. Readers interested in a detailed =
treatment=20
of the Bush administration and Iraq may refer to John =
Prados,=20
Hoodwinked: The Documents that Reveal How Bush sold Us =
a=20
War. New York: The New Press, 2004.
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